



# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

## THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF



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25 MARCH 1966

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DAILY BRIEF  
25 MARCH 1966

1. South Vietnam

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Both Hué and Da Nang regained a semblance of normality today. The strike at Da Nang has ended and there were no mass meetings reported in either city. Hué radio, however, continued to pour out inflammatory propaganda. There are also reports that a five-day strike may be launched again in Da Nang beginning tomorrow.

General Thi is still in Hué. He is staying quiet, but shows no intention of returning to Saigon.

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2. Pakistan

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### 3. Indonesia


General Suharto's effort to maintain some show of deference to Sukarno seems the main reason for delay in the announcement of a cabinet to replace the present interim regime. The lingering aura around Sukarno, as the "George Washington of Indonesia," is still a factor, and the generals are hoping for Sukarno's formal approval of the new cabinet list.

Sukarno's temporary emergence from wraps the other night at a dazzling Pakistani reception in Djakarta dramatized the extent of his decline. He appeared in his brilliant bemedaled uniform, carrying his magic baton, and tried hard to appear his old self. But his speech [redacted] was ignored 50X1  
by many guests.

### 4. Soviet Union

Moscow is buzzing with rumors that the Soviet party congress which opens on Tuesday will announce an unusually large number of high-level personnel shifts. Today's Annex discusses this question as well as a number of the other problems which will be aired at the congress.

### 5. Soviet Union



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
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6. Rhodesia



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7. Turkey



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**8. France**

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## ANNEX

The Soviet Party Congress

A Soviet party congress is remindful of an old-time vaudeville show. Before it starts the audience is never quite sure whether the thing will really produce something new and exciting or merely turn out to be a warmed-over variation of an old routine. With Stalin, the congress became a rather dull affair, but Khrushchev changed all that with his secret speech at the congress in 1956 and again at the 1961 congress with his decision to flaunt the fight with China.

The congress opening on Tuesday will probably fall somewhere between the two extremes. Brezhnev, the man in charge of the show, not only lacks Khrushchev's dramatic bent, but he also seems in no mood for unnecessary trouble. Still there are a number of sensitive issues which he must discuss and there is no guarantee that he can completely control the repercussions.

Brezhnev will set the tone for the congress in his "accountability report" to the party--a speech which sometimes goes on for as long as eight hours. Its purpose is to defend the party's record in recent years and to outline its plans for the future.

Brezhnev's foreign policy statement is likely to focus mostly on past successes. His line on Vietnam will probably contain nothing new. His stand on the Chinese problem is not clear, but the indications are that he will not elect to carry the fight into the congress. Overall, Brezhnev's aim will be to serve up a convincing resumé of Soviet efforts to justify its claim of being the leading Communist power.

In internal affairs, Brezhnev's touchiest task will be to define the line on Khrushchev's ouster. It is an open question just how far the criticisms and charges will go, but they must go far enough to justify the lambasting Khrushchev has already taken.

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## ANNEX (Cont'd)

There is currently a great deal of talk in Moscow that the congress will add to Khrushchev's sins by blaming him for blackening Stalin unnecessarily. In the process, it is expected that Brezhnev will come out with a new formulation on Stalin--one that recognizes his "achievements" as well as his "faults." The problem here is that the party is not interested in a rehabilitation of Stalin per se, but finds itself under considerable pressure to set the record straight by acknowledging the achievements of the Stalin era.

This kind of tinkering is bound to be dangerous even if it is handled cautiously. It can only encourage the conservative elements in the Soviet Union and put a new scare into the "liberals." In time, this could even lead to factional fighting not only in the Soviet party but also in the parties of Eastern Europe and the free world. In all likelihood, Brezhnev will try to get by with a minimum statement.

A number of other subjects will be taken up. Kosygin will speak at length on the new five-year plan, but we expect nothing new because most of the decisions were published last month. There will also be an attempt to clarify the role of the party in relation to the economic leadership--the problem of how to lead without meddling. This has always been a nasty issue. We also expect to hear a great deal of talk about the indifference of Soviet youth to ideology.

If there are any dramatic moments at the congress they might come during the discussions following the presentation of the formal reports. The well-prepared scenario could break down if some of the foreign party delegations try to debate the Chinese problem. There is also a chance of some fireworks resulting from the new words on Stalin.

The final order of business will be the "election" of a new Central Committee, which in turn will "elect" the real leadership--the members of the party

## ANNEX (Cont'd)

presidium. We anticipate a sizable turnover in both groups, but not among the individuals who really count. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] It will be interesting to see who gets passed over, but much more instructive to find out the kind of younger men who are about to enter the inner circle.

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